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INTRODUCTION
Two competing theories attempt to define the essence of intellectual property. One theory holds that intellectual property
rights are no different than the ownership of tangible private
property, such as houses and cars.1 The contrasting theory is
that the right to own an idea is quite different from the property
rights afforded to ownership of physical property.2 Proponents of
this latter argument generally disagree with intellectual property laws, claiming that they effectuate “intellectual monopolies”
in an economy that should instead encourage competition.3 Part
I of this Comment explains the problems with characterizing intellectual property as tangible private property. An understanding of each rationale is necessary to comprehend each side’s justification for protecting, or not protecting, intellectual property
rights.
Part II of this Comment highlights the historical campaign
for property rights conducted by copyright proponents. It outlines the path toward absolute and perpetual copyright protection that is currently being taken both by Congress and the
Courts. Furthermore, it stresses the blatant disregard for both
the intended meaning of the Constitution and the importance of
free and unobstructed dissemination of information.
To show exactly what this campaign means for creative and
economic efficiencies, Part III parallels the current copyright legal model with implications that violate the honorable intentions
of antitrust law. Here, an analysis of the media industries is undertaken, specifically calling attention to empirical data of market monopolization. Furthermore, government-granted monopolies generate undue market power, causing market
fragmentation and consumer frustration when copyrighted products are tied with incompatible patented technology. Finally,
Part III emphasizes the internal burdens that intellectual property laws, and more specifically copyright laws, place on the creative process.
Part IV discusses recent changes in the law of eminent domain, in evaluating the Fifth Amendment’s application to the
framework of copyrights. Although the idea has never been implemented due to strong opposition, this Part explains that intel1 Eugene Volokh, Sovereign Immunity and Intellectual Property, 73 S. CAL. L. REV.
1161, 1167 (2000) (“Intellectual property advocates often stress that intellectual property
is property, with dignity and worth equal to that of tangible property.”).
2 Michele Boldrin & David K. Levine, Property Rights and Intellectual Monopoly, at
para. 2, http://www.dklevine.com/general/intellectual/coffee.htm (last visited Apr. 8,
2007).
3 Id. at para. 9.
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lectual property, and more specifically copyrights, are at risk of
becoming subject to the government’s power of eminent domain.
State governments have the constitutional authority to undertake this action, and the U.S. Supreme Court has ensured state
immunity from suit for infringing certain intellectual property
rights. Through a proposed system of compulsory licensing and
periodical payments of just compensation, the market inefficiencies caused by perpetual copyright protection will be alleviated,
and the incentive to create will remain intact.
Part IV discusses the real possibility of eminent domain’s
application to copyright, and should be considered as a warning
to copyright proponents. Thus, it does not zealously advocate for
broad government power over property, whether that property is
tangible or intangible. Instead, Part IV should be understood to
proffer one possible resolution, albeit unfavorable to copyright
owners, to the problems that arise from copyright’s campaign for
perpetual protection. Copyright proponents should take heed to
this suggested path and realize that their staunch position for
property rights may lead them to unwanted consequences. Indeed, the very position that they take opens the door for the government to apply its eminent domain power over copyrights.
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OR GOVERNMENT-GRANTED
MONOPOLY: WHY THE INTANGIBLE SHOULD NOT BECOME
TANGIBLE
A. Theory One: Intellectual Property
The Copyright Clause of the U.S. Constitution secures for
authors “the exclusive Right to their respective Writings,” but
only “for limited Times.”4 Literalists, while disregarding the language “for limited Times,” equate such exclusivity to that which
is afforded by property laws to owners of real and personal private property.5 Proponents make a case that an idea is “property,” as that word is read and understood in property class as a
first year law student.6 Thus, “[t]he argument exploits an ambiguity in the common usage of the word ‘idea’ to incorrectly equate
the usual meaning of the word ‘property’ and its specific meaning
in ‘intellectual property.’”7 Advocates for the private property argument (“Private Property”) tend to be “rent-seekers with a
vested interest in the existing law.”8 It is no surprise that the
most recent legislation pushing copyright protection closer to
4
5
6
7
8

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
Volokh, supra note 1, at 1167.
Id.
Boldrin & Levine, supra note 2, at para. 2.
Id.
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perpetual property rights9 was backed by notorious copyright
owners such as Disney and Bob Dylan.10 Understandably, owners of moneymaking assets will want those assets protected.
Thus, it is the result of lobbying and rent-seeking motives that
the term “intellectual property” has replaced that which only a
generation ago was coined “copyright.”11 Regardless of the motive for the campaign for Private Property, legislators have taken
heed.12
Proponents of Private Property continue to rest their case on
Locke’s Labor Theory,13 which creates the assumption that by
mixing our labor with something, we make that thing our own.
Thus, the application of intellectual property to this theory creates the following equation: mental labor plus other ideas equals
private property. Accordingly, “[i]deas and expressions and inventions are all the product of mixing our labor, in this case our
mental labor, with the common property of preexisting ideas and
information.”14 It is a fundamental assumption that property
rights, if recognized through a legal system, provide incentive to
expend resources to improve that property.15 The argument follows that authors and inventors need incentive to create their
works, and that without this incentive, innovation and invention
would be no more. Pointing to the Copyright Clause in the Constitution, advocates latch onto legal positivism, claiming that the
Framers promised to “promote the . . . Arts”16 by affording exclusive control over that which is original. Without such a guarantee, there would be no incentive to expend mental labor.17 ThereCopyright Term Extension Act, 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000).
Jesse Walker, How Intellectual Property Laws Stifle Popular Culture, REASON,
Mar. 2000, at 46, available at http://www.reason.com/news/show/27635.html (last visited
Apr. 8, 2007).
11 Gary Shapiro, President, Consumer Electronics Assoc., Remarks at the Cato Institute Conference: Copyright Controversies: Freedom, Property, Content Creation, and the
DMCA, in Copyrights and Property Rights, CATO POLICY REPORT, July–Aug. 2006, at 17
(“‘[I]ntellectual property’ didn’t even exist a generation ago; it was just called copyright.”).
12 Id. (“Copyright protection has also expanded immeasurably over the last three
decades. Terms of protection are much longer. The original term was set in 1790 at 14
years. Congress has acted 13 times to expand the length of the copyright terms; 11 of
those expansions were passed during the last 40 years.”).
13 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 287–88 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1988) (1690) (“The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we
may say, are properly his.”).
14 Jim Harper, Director of Information Policy Studies, Cato Institute, Remarks at
the Cato Institute Conference: Copyright Controversies: Freedom, Property, Content
Creation, and the DMCA, in Copyrights and Property Rights, supra note 11, at 15.
15 David K. Levine, Co-author of Against Intellectual Monopoly, Remarks at the Cato
Institute Conference: Copyright Controversies: Freedom, Property, Content Creation, and
the DMCA, in Copyrights and Property Rights, supra note 11, at 16.
16 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
17 Thomas G. Field Jr., What is Intellectual Property?, FOCUS ON INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS 2 (2006), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/intelprp/
9
10
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fore, this incentive is so necessary that intellectual property
should be governed similarly to tangible private property.18 The
creator of an original idea should be able to completely exclude
all others from it, and should be able to possess, use, and transfer
it as the owner sees fit. As one professor has stated,
Intellectually or artistically gifted people have the right to prevent the
unauthorized use or sale of their creations, just the same as owners of
physical property, such as cars, buildings, and stores. Yet, compared
to makers of chairs, refrigerators, and other tangible goods, people
whose work is essentially intangible face more difficulties in earning a
living if their claim to their creations is not respected. Artists, authors, inventors, and others unable to rely on locks and fences to protect their work turn to IP rights to keep others from harvesting the
fruits of their labor.19

B. Theory Two: Intellectual Monopoly
Opponents of Private Property distinguish intellectual property from private property.20 The Constitution, the importance of
the public domain, and the effect that intellectual property laws
ostensibly have on economic efficiency all lend support to this argument.21 At the outset, this theory is more easily understood by
defining the fundamental characteristics of tangible property and
contrasting these inherent traits with those of intangible property.
Physical property is a scarce resource, and its use and possession is limited. Inherent in tangible things is the fact that two
people cannot possess the same thing at the same time.22 Thus,
the sale or transfer of physical property necessarily means that
the prior possessor cannot use it anymore. Similarly, the execution of the right to exclude necessarily means that the owner will
be the only one who can use it. Copying tangible goods is a limited process, because again, other tangible goods must be used as
production materials.23 “[P]roperty rights in tangible goods,”
from an economics perspective, help facilitate efficient transactional interaction “in the context of scarcity.”24 Without such
iprbook.pdf.
18 Volokh, supra note 1, at 1167.
19 Field Jr., supra note 17, at 2–3 (emphasis added).
20 Boldrin & Levine, supra note 2, at para. 2.
21 The constitutional support and the importance of the public domain are analyzed
in Part I. The effect of IP laws on economic efficiency is evaluated in Part III.
22 Harper, supra note 14, at 15 (“If I have an apple and you want to eat it too, we
can’t both eat it without bumping our faces together and making quite a mess. In economic parlance, an apple is a rivalrous physical good. No two people can possess it at the
same time.”).
23 Id.
24 Id.

789-822 MCCLURE.DOC

794

9/18/2007 7:03:35 AM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 10:789

property rights, transaction costs would be extremely high because resources such as time and energy would be spent ensuring
exclusive possession and protection. Realistically, the market for
transferring tangible goods becomes an arena for animalistic behavior.
In contrast, intellectual property is not similarly scarce. The
creator of an idea may still enjoy that idea exclusively, but only if
he or she does not reveal it. He or she may, however, communicate that idea to another person, and still retain an identical
copy; the original copy.25 However, the transferee’s copy “leads
an existence entirely independent of [the transferor’s] copy.”26
The new copy may be limitlessly transferred or duplicated without affecting the original copy. Consider the following scenario:
You teaching me the law is a production process through which at
least three private, rivalrous, and excludable inputs (your idea, your
time, and my time) generate a private, rivalrous, and excludable output: my knowledge of the law . . . . If you were to die, my copy of the
idea of the law . . . would continue to exist, and would be at least just
as useful as it would have been had you remained alive. My copy of
the law . . . possesses, therefore, economic value. Similarly, your copy
of the law . . . also possesses economic value.27

An idea is not a public good, and may be excludable. Yet, an idea
may multiply without depleting resources, and once it is disclosed, it becomes public.28
The argument against Private Property, then, insists that
intellectual property is not ‘property’ at all. Instead, it is simply
a government-granted monopoly;29 it is a license to possess, use,
and transfer your idea. From an economic standpoint, monopolies are unfavorable in a capitalist system, because they thwart
efficiency while raising prices to consumers.30 Therefore, intellectual monopolies “restrict distribution—by producing fewer copies and by making copies more expensive,”31 availing fewer people of the intellectual product.
Furthermore, many ideas are born from other ideas. Many
patents are innovations, or rather, new ways of using other resources or patents.32 Numerous nonfiction books are written by
Boldrin & Levine, supra note 2, at para. 3.
Id.
Id.
Harper, supra note 14, at 15.
Walker, supra note 10, at 46.
Levine, supra note 15, at 16.
Id.
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998), available at
www.sciencemag.org/cgi/reprint/280/5364/698.pdf (“By conferring monopolies in discover25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
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reading and researching other books. Many songs contain samples of other songs.33 Therefore, an author may be able to earn
more money from the use of his or her copyright, but may have to
pay more for the ingredients for creating the work.34 There is
friction in the creative process imputable to the recognition of
copyrights. The argument that copyrights instill incentive to
create is met with the fact that they deter innovative action.35
The notion that copyrights are slowing, instead of protecting,
the creative process is all too evident in the realm of software and
technology.36 Our current economy, including the entertainment
industry, is driven by technology.37 While the Record Industry
Association of America (“RIAA”) complains of lost sales on the
front end because of technology’s facilitation of pirating music, it
neglects to mention that the cost of recording and the difficulty
with which it is now done has been extremely diminished by new
technology.38 Because of new technology, major studios are not
the only producers of professional-sounding music. Software
programs such as Sony Acid Pro39 can be purchased and used in a
living room with a personal computer. Accordingly, more production means more music at a cheaper price. In the software industry, the concept has been pushed by many eager advocates, exemplified by the Open Source Software initiative.40 Still, the
ies . . . complex obstacles . . . arise when a user needs access to multiple patented inputs
to create a single useful product.”).
33 Boldrin & Levine, supra note 2, at para. 20 (“We can’t create great new music by
modifying wonderful old music because all the wonderful old music is under copyright at
least until the 22nd century.”).
34 Levine, supra note 15, at 16.
35 Boldrin & Levine, supra note 2, at para. 20 (“The greatest bar to this outpouring of
wonderful new innovative music . . . is the copyright system. If we were to abolish copyright today we are confident that the most important effect would be a vast increase in
the quantity and quality of music available.”).
36 Id. at para. 20 (“[M]odern technology, rather than strengthening the case for intellectual monopoly in music, weakens it.”).
37 Walker, supra note 10, at 49 (“Where samizdat artists once had to make do with
photocopiers and audio cassettes, they now can use videotapes, camcorders, Photoshop,
digital film editing, recordable CDs, MP3 files, and the Internet. The result has been an
explosion of amateur films, fiction, and music, all of which can be ‘published’ for a minimal investment by putting them on the Web.”).
38 Boldrin & Levine, supra note 2, at para. 20 (“[T]he cost of producing the first
copy . . . has decreased enormously due to the same computer technology that makes it so
easy to copy music.”).
39 Sony Announces Major Acid Pro Software Upgrade, INTERNET VIDEO MAGAZINE,
Jan. 19, 2006, http://www.internetvideomag.com/News/News2006/011906_Sony_Acid_
Pro.htm.
40 Go
Open Source, The Basics of OSS, http://www.go-opensource.org/
software_basics/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2007) (“The basic idea behind open source is very
simple: when programmers can read, redistribute, and modify the source code for a piece
of software, the software evolves. People improve it, people adapt it, people fix bugs. And
this can happen at a speed that, if one is used to the slow pace of conventional software
development, seems astonishing.”).
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Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) “creates new restrictions on technology, and those restrictions lead to lawsuits and a
sharp decline in available venture capital.”41 The DMCA, the
latest major copyright legislation, provides copyright owners with
added protection against new technology.42 In its wake, technology, itself subject to copyright law, suffers from constraints.
Summarily, increased copyright protection results in decreased
facilitation of copyright production.
C. Contrast: Property Rights and Intellectual Property Rights
In comparison, intellectual property laws take a step further
in affording protection than do most tangible property rights.
Tangible property rights give a person the right to use the property exclusively or to transfer it. Once tangible property has
been transferred, the rights of the prior possessor are discontinued. However, intellectual property rights continue after the
property has been transferred.43 Effectively, intellectual property laws grant the owner the right to control the transferee’s use
of the property after it has been transferred. Economists Michael
Boldrin and David Levine view the sale of intellectual property,
under current intellectual property law, as a contract not to compete. They assert that “[t]he most significant feature is the
agreement not to sell copies of the idea in competition with the
person who sold you the idea. Outside of the area of ‘intellectual
property’ such an agreement would be called anti-competitive,
and a violation of the antitrust law.”44
The argument against treating intellectual property as private property, in essence, claims that intellectual property laws
implicitly violate antitrust law, and consequently create monopolies that are not allowed otherwise.45 This argument is supported
by Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, which explicitly prevents intellectual property laws from effectuating perpetual monopolies. This Clause affords exclusive rights to “Writings
and Discoveries” for “limited Times.”46 Thus, while proponents of
Private Property point to exclusive rights, opponents point to the
limited nature of the guarantee. Inferred from this limited right
or limited license is Congress’s intention to create a public doShapiro, supra note 11, at 17.
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000).
Boldrin & Levine, supra note 2, at para. 7 (“Intellectual property law is not about
your right to control your copy of your idea . . . . What intellectual property law is really
about is about your right to control my copy of your idea.”).
44 Id. at para. 8.
45 Id. (“Ordinarily . . . we do not consider monopoly power necessary to provide adequate incentives for economic activity.”).
46 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
41
42
43
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main, or a pool of ideas for public use without limitation.47 The
rationale for creating a public domain goes hand-in-hand with
the argument against intellectual monopoly. The Founding Fathers must have anticipated that the free flow of information
would be pertinent to the creative process and the furtherance of
original but resourceful ingeniousness. A public domain, it is argued, “contributes to a democratic society, a strong economy, and
the advancement of science.”48
On one hand, the argument that intellectual property laws
provide incentive to create has some merit, for monetary motivations are reasonably understandable. On the other, perpetual
protection resembling property rights might effectuate monopolies which, in turn, implicitly violate antitrust laws.49 The argument against Private Property makes it evident that intellectual
property is not tangible property, and the laws that govern tangible property elicit economic efficiency problems when applied to
ideas. While most advocates of Private Property relish protection
of their own rights, they would be narrow-minded to discount the
importance of access to other ideas. When balancing the importance of the broad dissemination of knowledge and information
with the significance of ensuring appropriate protection to authors and inventors, one commentator has offered a settlementinducing observation: “Free and forward-moving societies need
both.”50 Nevertheless, Private Property advocates should be
wary of the extent to which the need for protection is overstated,
for unforeseen implications may surface as a result of overcompensation.
II. COPYRIGHT’S CAMPAIGN FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS
The Copyright Clause of the Constitution provides Congress
the power “[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.”51 Such
promotion is to be accomplished, specifically, “by securing for
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their respective Writings.”52 The foresight of the Founding Fathers was impressive, for they recognized the importance of creative roles in a
progressive society. Yet, “useful Arts” in the late eighteenth century could not have put the Founding Fathers on notice of the ex47 Anita Eisenstadt, The Importance of the Public Domain, in FOCUS ON
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, supra note 17, at 60 (“[T]he Founding Fathers of the
United States realized that it is critical to balance the intellectual property interests of
authors and inventors with society’s need for the exchange of ideas.”).
48 Id.
49 See infra Part III.
50 Eisenstadt, supra note 47, at 61.
51 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
52 Id. (emphasis added).
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tensive material which would become subject to legislation because of the power granted by this Clause. In the two-plus centuries that Congress has possessed this power to promote the
arts, it has only increased the duration of the copyright term, and
therefore the strength of the right, for authors and creators.53
Implicit in this line of legislation is the continued assumption
that incentive is the most important, and most vulnerable, factor
for furthering creative progressiveness, and that term extensions
stimulate incentive.54
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court encountered the
constitutionality of the latest copyright term extension.55 The
copyright legislation at issue was the Copyright Term Extension
Act, passed in 1998.56 The Act enlarged the duration of copyrights by twenty years.57 Before upholding the extension, Justice
Ginsberg gave a detailed and chronological account of the history
of copyright legislation.58 What she uncovered was a steadfast
course toward perpetual exclusive ownership of copyrights.
Copyright’s campaign for property rights began in 1790,
when “[t]he Nation’s first copyright statute . . . provided a federal
copyright term of 14 years from the date of publication, renewable for an additional 14 years if the author survived the first
term.”59 In 1831, copyright protection enjoyed its first extension,
expanding the federal copyright term to forty-two years, including twenty-eight years of protection from the date of publication
and a fourteen-year renewal.60 The copyright front was silent
until 1909, when the term was again expanded to fifty-six years,
keeping the twenty-eight-year protection but extending the renewal period to twenty-eight years.61 In 1976, “Congress altered
the method for computing federal copyright terms.”62 The 1976
Act extended protection for all works created after the effective
date of January 1, 1978, by an identified natural person, to fifty
years after the author’s death.63 For works already published be53 Tim Lee, What’s So Eminent About Public Domain: The Copyright Lobby Makes a
Dubious Case for IP Protection, REASONONLINE, Oct. 31, 2005, http://www.reason.com/
news/show/32988.html (“Despite the [c]onstitutional requirement that copyrights be ‘for
limited [T]imes,’ Congress has effectively made them perpetual, one extension at a time.”).
54 See H.R. REP. NO. 105-452, at 4 (1998) (stating that term extension “provide[s]
copyright owners generally with the incentive to restore older works and further disseminate them to the public”).
55 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 194 (2003).
56 Id. at 195.
57 Id. at 193, 195.
58 Id. at 194–96.
59 Id. at 194; Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (1790).
60 Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16, §§ 1, 16, 4 Stat. 436, 436, 439 (1831).
61 Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080 (1909).
62 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 194.
63 1976 Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553 § 302(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2572 (1976) (current version

789-822 MCCLURE.DOC

2007]

9/18/2007 7:03:35 AM

Copyright’s Campaign for Property Rights

799

fore the effective date, “the 1976 Act granted a copyright term of
75 years from the date of publication,” which was a nineteen-year
increase from the fifty-six-year term granted under the 1909
Act.64 The last major extension, the CTEA, increased the copyright term to the life of the author plus seventy years.65 However, these major Acts do not complete the list of legislative activity expanding copyright terms. The copyright term has been
lengthened eleven times in the past forty years.66 In just a
twelve-year span between 1962 and 1974, it was lengthened nine
times.67 Not a single legislative act has curtailed this expansion
towards perpetual protection for copyrights.
In Eldred, Justice Ginsburg used this history as evidence of
Congress’s intentions, and, presuming the correctness behind the
rationale for it, she reasoned that such a course should be shown
deference.68 Such deference, though, and such a course, must
discontinue at some point if it is going to parallel the Constitution’s mandate that such a monopoly be “for limited Times,”69 and
in order to create an all-important public domain. Still, the Eldred court elected to follow “rationally credited projections that
longer terms would encourage copyright holders to invest in the
restoration and public distribution of their works.”70 This rationale works for copyrights already owned by companies such as
Disney and artists such as Bob Dylan.71 However, for works that
have yet to be created, no resourceful knowledge or creation has
become accessible through the public domain since the 1970s,
unless copyright owners chose not to renew them.72 Importantly,
“[t]he limitation is not for the advantage of the inventor, but of
society at large, which is to take the benefit of the invention after
the period of limitation has expired.”73 This means that society’s
advantage has not been realized in the past thirty years.74
at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2000)).
64 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 195 (citations omitted); 1976 Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304(a)–
(b), 90 Stat. 2541, 2573–74 (1976) (current version at 17 U.S.C. §§ 304(a)–(b) (2000)).
65 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000).
66 Walker, supra note 10, at 46.
67 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 195 n.2.
68 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)
(“[I]t is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted to authors . . . .”); Eldred, 537 U.S. at 198 (“[T]his Court
has been similarly deferential to the judgment of Congress in the realm of copyright.”).
69 U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8.
70 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 207.
71 Walker, supra note 10, at 46.
72 Tim Lee, supra note 53.
73 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 224 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 175 (1824)).
74 Boldrin & Levine, supra note 2, at para. 20 (“Indeed, with modern computers
there are a great many creative innovators . . . lacking perhaps the physical skills and
training to play an instrument . . . or even to read sheet music . . . who could modify, edit
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Over two hundred years ago, the rationale was much different than it is today. In 1829, the “main object was ‘to promote
the progress of . . . useful arts;’ and this could be done best, by
giving the public at large [access to the works] . . . at as early a
period as possible.”75 This rationale remains consistent in patent
law, as the Supreme Court noted in 1964 that a state could not
“extend the life of a patent beyond its expiration date,” and in
1989 that “free exploitation of ideas will be the rule, to which the
protection of a federal patent is the exception.”76 Still, the campaign for property rights continues in the copyright arena. This
campaign can, without mistake, be somewhat attributed to the
lobbying efforts of copyright owners, and in particular by corporate copyright owners.77 Justice Breyer has commented that the
“primary legal effect is to grant the extended term not to authors
but to their . . . corporate successors.”78 In the past decade, RIAA
has increasingly complained of music pirating on the internet,
which is facilitated by file-sharing websites.79 It brought its
plight to the eyes of the watching world, and it received enormous sympathy and compassion in the courts. Consequently,
copyright owners are undefeated in the past decade in the Supreme Court, including a recent 9-0 victory in MGM v. Grokster.80
Grokster involved copyright infringement claims against a
company that provided an arena for, and facilitated the practice
of, sharing music files online.81 In that case, the Court held that
“one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use
to infringe copyright . . . is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”82 Drawing a parallel to real property, one who sets up a gun or knife store undoubtedly “distributes a device with the object of promoting its use” to kill or
injure. Nevertheless, he is not “liable for the resulting acts” of
murder “by third parties.” This parallel may not include all of
and create great new music on their home computers at trivial cost. The greatest bar to
this outpouring of wonderful new innovative music . . . if you haven’t guessed already . . . is the copyright system.”).
75 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 19 (1829) (quoting U.S. CONST. art I, § 8,
cl. 8).
76 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231 (1964); Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 151 (1989).
77 Lee, supra note 53 (“[T]hanks to industry lobbying, Congress extended the terms
in 1976, and again in 1998.”); see also Walker, supra note 10, at 46 (“Congress acts as a
rubber stamp for copyright holders, especially the big campaign donors in the entertainment industry.”).
78 Eldred, 537 U.S. at 243 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
79 John Borland, RIAA Sues 261 File Swappers, CNET NEWS.COM, Sept. 8, 2003,
http://news.com.com/2100-1023_3-5072564.html.
80 Lee, supra note 53; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S.
Ct. 2764, 2769 (2005).
81 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2770.
82 Id.
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the nuances which led to the Court’s reasoning in Grokster, but it
displays the echelon that copyright protection has reached in the
Court.
The Court went on to admit that “it may be impossible to enforce rights in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers.”83 However, such impossibility results from Congress’s
inability to grasp the profundity and complexity that protecting
ideas entails. Without question, rewarding creation is important.
That the means for this end must be absolute and unqualified,
similar to property rights, is unreasonable and “impossible.”
Nevertheless, like Congress, the Court decided that artistic protection was more important than encouraging technological innovation, and the only way to absolutely protect it was to penalize
somebody.84 In light of the recognized impossibility for absolute
protection, the Court resorted to the position that “the only practical alternative [would be] to go against the distributor of the
copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory
or vicarious infringement.”85 The Court’s retreat to alternatives,
while recognizing that “technological innovation may be discouraged,”86 elicits one clear interpretation: protecting ideas as if they
were property, though noble, may not be efficient.
The entertainment industry has argued for, and received,
longer protection. Adversaries have noted, however, that it is not
about increasing the protection of copyrights that is at issue. Instead, it is about increasing the protection of a business model.87
One commentator has warily observed that “[i]t is not about the
right to the fruits of one’s own labor. It is not about the incentive
to create, innovate or improve. It is about the ‘right’ to preserve
an existing way of doing business.”88 Ironically, the business
model of the recording industry, which thrives on creation, has
clearly been threatened by creation. To this end, famous author
Robert Heinlein ascribes the following:
There has grown up in the minds of certain groups in this country the
notion that because a man or corporation has made a profit out of the
public for a number of years, the government and the courts are
charged with the duty of guaranteeing such profit in the future, even
in the face of changing circumstances and contrary public interest.
This strange doctrine is not supported by statute nor common law.
Neither individuals nor corporations have any right to come into court
Id. at 2776.
Id. at 2775 (“The more artistic protection is favored, the more technological innovation may be discouraged . . . .”).
85 Id. at 2776.
86 Id.
87 Boldrin & Levine, supra note 2, at para. 21.
88 Id.
83
84
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and ask that the clock of history be stopped, or turned back, for their
private benefit.89

The recording industry, more than any other copyrightdriven industry, is undergoing changes and challenges to its
business model.90 Despite the woes that new technology supposedly has caused, “[t]he music industry will be the greatest beneficiary of the digital revolution.”91 Despite the revenue streams
that have been created, and that will be created, through new
and more refined licensing models enabled by innovative technologies, the industry continues to look to “technical protection
measures to ensure that producers reali[z]e the value of recorded
music.”92 Such measures include encryption technology which
would prevent certain uses of a copyright after it is purchased,
propounding the idea that copyright protection controls not only
how a good is distributed but also how that good is used after a
consumer purchases it.93 Additionally, industry leaders believe
that internationally compatible systems for identification of information technology are necessary for increased copyright protection, and that “tattooing” of protected materials and electronic
copyright management is essential.94
It is ironic that proponents of increased copyright protection
should call technology the culprit and the savior at the same
time. Even more astonishing is the recent Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (“DMCA”), which made it illegal to circumvent certain protection technologies with new technology.95 Allen Dixon,
General Counsel and Executive Director for IFPI, has proclaimed
that “[u]nauthori[z]ed circumvention activities and circumvention devices weaken the robustness and integrity of any technical
measure developed . . . .”96 In other words, the DMCA, and proponents of stronger copyright protection like Dixon, would undermine the rationale for copyright protection, i.e., the incentive
to create and innovate, by preventing the advancement of technological innovation in order to preserve a way of doing business.
Dixon adds that “[w]hile telecommunications and information
ROBERT A. HEINLEIN, Life-Line, in THE PAST THROUGH TOMORROW 25 (1967).
Allen N. Dixon, General Counsel and Executive Director, IFPI, Future Issues for
the Protection of Phonogram Producers, Speech at the JSO 4th Asia-Pacific Copyright and
Neighbouring Rights Seminar, Tokyo, Mar. 8, 2000, available at http://www.ifpi.org/
content/section_views/allen_dixon_speech.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
91 Id. (quoting Gerald Levin, Chairman and Chief Eexecutive Officer, Time Warner).
92 Id.
93 Boldrin & Levine, supra note 2, at para. 6.
94 Dixon, supra note 90, at II(a).
95 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000). For more details on the legislative history of the DMCA,
see David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U. PA.
L. REV. 673, at 702–38 (2000).
96 Dixon, supra note 90, at II(b).
89
90
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technologies are intriguing in their own right, public acceptance
and demand for advanced communications and information processing technology is driven by content.”97 This is where the industry is wrong. The demand for content, or music, already existed before advanced information technologies were born. It is
the demand for the new technologies—the handheld MP3 player,
the cell phone, or the next big thing—that makes music more accessible, that drives the demand for more content. Take the new
information technologies away, and people will find ways to create them again. That is innovation, not circumvention.
Whatever the intent of the campaign may be, the effect is
real and the same. Copyright protection, evidenced by both congressional activity and judicial decision, has continuously and increasingly resembled that which is afforded property rights. In
some capacities, copyright protection exceeds that afforded to
tangible property. This course has both current and future implications. These legal monopolies have begun to sustain recognizable impacts on relevant markets.98 In the aggregate, these
effects can influence commerce and economic efficiency in ways
that antitrust laws seek to prevent.
III. WHY ABSOLUTE COPYRIGHT PROTECTION AMOUNTS TO A
VIOLATION OF ANTITRUST LAW
A. Antitrust and Intellectual Property: The Intersection
During the U.S. Industrial Revolution, railroad tycoons, oil
robber barons, and steel giants swallowed competition “while
reaping monster profits through unconscionable business activity.”99 Technological innovation, manufacturing, and transportation were all stabilized by set standards created in “Trusts.”100
Effectively, these Trusts created predictable standards in prices
and quality, but as a result, they restrained price competition by
controlling production.101 Market entry barriers stifled the incentive for improving products. Such monopolistic business practices led to the birth of antitrust law.102 Today, courts do not
usually see such blatantly unlawful business activity. However,
with the assistance of intellectual property laws, subtle market

Id. at para. 4 (emphasis added).
See infra Part III.
Eddy Hsu, Anti-Trust Regulation Applied to Problems in Cyberspace: iTunes and
iPod, 9 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 117, 122 (2005); see also Marc Winerman, The Origins of
the FTC: Concentration, Cooperation, Control, and Competition, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 6–7
(2003) (describing the history of antitrust in more detail).
100 Hsu, supra note 99, at 122.
101 Id.
102 Id.
97
98
99
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mechanisms are exploited to create economies of scale.103 The
question to be determined in the copyright forum is whether
these economies of scale negatively impact economic efficiency
and consumer behavior, and whether they deter the incentive to
create. If so, advocacy for absolutely exclusive and perpetual
copyright protection may rise to the level of encouraging the violation of antitrust law.
The right to own an idea exclusively is often conceded to be a
government-granted monopoly.104 Monopolistic behavior is more
easily attributable to the work of patents, for such a right enables an individual or corporation to exclude others from using or
selling a useful, and in some cases necessary, product or good.
For example, in the pharmaceutical industry, the cure for cancer
could, in theory, be patented and held exclusively. As a result,
the owner of such a patent could charge unconscionable prices for
the remedy to this deadly disease.
B. The Early Doctrine: Patents
In patent law, the courts have frequently confronted the
question of whether a government-granted monopoly is an exception to antitrust law. “In any given case, courts . . . had to find
that one or the other concept took precedence,” and at first,
“courts considered patents to be a government-endorsed exception to the antitrust laws.”105 In 1902, one Supreme Court decision explicitly held that the practice of price-fixing by patent
holders deserved immunity.106 In the early days of antitrust law,
patent law and antitrust law were at odds, and many believed
that they worked in different directions.107 After all, patent law
granted monopolies, and antitrust law prevented them.108 Nevertheless, the recent prevailing idea is that they work together.109
In Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., the court proclaimed that “the aims and objectives of patent and antitrust
laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at odds. However, the two
bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at

Id.
Sheila F. Anthony, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Law: From Adversaries to
Partners, 28 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 4 (Winter 2000) (“For much of this century, courts and federal
agencies regarded patents as conferring monopoly power in a relevant market.”); Walker,
supra note 10, at 46 (“Copyrights, unlike trademarks, have always posed problems, even
if you think they’re necessary. They are, after all, government-granted monopolies . . . .”).
105 Anthony, supra note 104, at 4–5.
106 Bement v. Nat’l Harrow Co., 186 U.S. 70, 92, 95 (1902) (holding that the practice
of patent pooling was exempted from the reach of antitrust, despite blatant price fixing).
107 Anthony, supra note 104, at 4.
108 Id. at 4–6.
109 Id. at 7.
103
104
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encouraging innovation, industry and competition.”110 The court
in Atari Games, exemplifying the current movement of thinking
in this arena, may have confused two very important factors.
That is, there is a large difference between protecting the competitive process and protecting the competitor.111 Both bodies of
law may fundamentally encourage innovation in some respect,
and both may encourage, or preserve, industry to some capacity.112 Yet antitrust law protects competition, while intellectual
property law protects one competitor. This concept is what keeps
antitrust and intellectual property law at odds, and in the court,
together.
C. The New Problem: Copyrights
Copyrights involve antitrust inclinations in a much more
contained faculty than do patents. The right to exclusively use
and sell the cure for cancer, conceivably the result of a single
patent, could obviously confer monopoly power that would harm
consumers and production of the product. On the other hand, the
right to exclusively use and sell a book or a song, by itself, would
not normally impact an entire market for literature or music.
However, in the aggregate, such exclusive rights could bring
copyright ownership to the same level of projected impact as that
of an important and useful process or product.
Recently, at a House of Representatives hearing, the Chair of
the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property stated the obvious: “Digital music not only has a future in
the music business; it is the future.”113 As discussed above, this
inevitably means that, as technology goes, so goes the music industry. Again, however, the legal system which supposedly protects and encourages the creation of music also hinders the adThis notion is what
vancement of certain technology.114

110 897 F.2d 1572, 1576, (Fed. Cir. 1990) (citing Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal Ltd., 781
F.2d 861, 876–77 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
111 Connie C. Davis, Copyright and Antitrust: The Effects of the Digital Performance
Rights in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 in Foreign Markets, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 411, 419
(2000) (“Antitrust laws are intended to protect the competitive process through economic
efficiency and competition. Antitrust laws are also geared towards enhancing competition, rather than protecting competitors.”).
112 Though this comment lays out problems resulting from this line of thinking, there
is still some merit to the argument that affording the right to some limited form of compensation to a creator will encourage further innovation. Similarly, such rights can preserve an industry, although such preservation may hinder the progressive nature of a
capitalist society.
113 Digital Music Licensing and Section 115 of the Copyright Act: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 1 (2005) (opening statement of Hon. Lamar Smith).
114 Boldrin & Levine, supra note 2, para. 20.
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revolutionized the aforementioned Open Source Initiative.115
Nevertheless, recognition of the need to sync music and new
technology has led companies which hold patented technology to
bid into the entertainment industry, and more specifically, into
the market for copyrights.116 The cross-market merging of giant
conglomerates has shrunk the diversity among those doing business in the entertainment and media industries.117 Reflect on the
following passage:
[I]n 1983, fifty corporations dominated most of every mass medium
and the biggest media merger in history was a $340 million
deal. . . . [I]n 1987, the fifty companies had shrunk to twentynine. . . . [I]n 1990, the twenty-nine had shrunk to twentythree . . . . [I]n 1997, the biggest firms numbered ten and involved the
$19 billion Disney-ABC deal, at the time the biggest media merger
ever. . . . [In 2000,] AOL Time Warner’s $350 billion merged corporation [was] more than 1,000 times larger [than the biggest deal of
1983].118

Currently, 71.7% of the recording industry’s global market
share is allocated to just four companies.119 However, horizontal
integration, the significant control of a specific media sector, is
not the largest problem for the free dissemination of information.
Instead, vertical integration of the media market, with the same
companies gaining ownership of content and the means to distribute it, causes this problem.120 In other words, the media moguls are gaining ownership of copyrights and patents, and they
are using them both to monopolize the content provided and the
means for distributing the content.
The best example of antitrust implications arising from combining a patented instrument for distribution with copyrighted
content comes from Apple’s iPod and iTunes venture.121 While
multiple MP3 players exist, the iPod is the only player licensed
by Apple to play music securely encoded with Apple’s AAC codec
technology.122 Thus, if consumers want to buy the iPod to listen
Open Source Initiative, http://www.opensource.org (last visited Apr. 8, 2007).
Kevin J. Delaney, Yahoo Bets on Media in Search for Online Advertising vs. Rival
Google, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE.COM, Mar. 2, 2005, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/
05061/465147.stm (last visited Apr. 5, 2007).
117 BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY xx–xxi (6th ed. 2000).
118 Id. (emphasis added).
119 Press Release, IFPI, The Recording Industry in Numbers 2005 (Aug. 2, 2005),
available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/section_news/20050802.html.
120 Robert W. McChesney, The New Global Media, THE NATION, Nov. 29, 1999, at 11,
available at http://www.thenation.com/doc/19991129/mcchesney.
121 See Apple’s homepage for the iPod, http://www.apple.com/ipod/ (last visited Apr. 5,
2007).
122 Apple, iTunes: About Third-party Music Players and AAC File Support,
http://docs.info.apple.com/article.html?artnum=93032 (last visited Apr. 5, 2007). Similarly, songs downloaded using other codec technology will not be able to play through
115
116
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to music on a portable music player, they must buy content from
iTunes. Therefore, the embedded link of AAC-encoded music between iTunes and the iPod raises a possible antitrust violation by
creating an illegal tie.123 Under Sections One and Two of the
Sherman Act, parties to a contract or an agreement in restraint
of trade, or made in an attempt to monopolize, shall be guilty of a
felony.124 “The Supreme Court has defined a tying arrangement
as an agreement by one party to sell [the tying] product to another on the condition that the buyer also purchase [the tied
product].”125 In this case, the collusion occurs between the consumer, who exclusively deals with Apple in the second market for
the tied product, and Apple, who excludes competition from the
second market.126
Apple’s product is technologically incompatible with the rest
of the market, and because the process becomes patented, other
companies are forced to invent different solutions to avoid paying
licensing fees. Proponents of intellectual property laws might
argue that this exemplifies incentive to invent, resulting in added
competition and availability. In actuality, the market becomes
fractured because of non-compliant standards, causing consumer
frustration.127 Consumers resort to buying the most accessible
product for a higher price. Economies of scale are achieved
through intellectual property protection at economic efficiency’s
expense. Consequently, an intellectual monopoly is born.
D. The Department of Justice’s Solution, the “Rule of Reason,”
and Copyrights
The legal community, specifically the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ), has attempted to address the clash between antitrust and intellectual
property by adopting the “rule of reason.”128 As a preliminary asiTunes. Id.
123 Hsu, supra note 99, at 123.
124 Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1. The Sherman Act declares that “[e]very contract . . . in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make
any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal
shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .” Id. “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .” Id. § 2.
125 Carl Sandburg Vill. Condo. Assoc. No. 1 v. First Condo. Dev. Co., 758 F.2d 203,
207 (7th Cir. 1985) (citing N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1958)).
126 Hsu, supra note 99, at 123.
127 Id.
128 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE
LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY § 3.4 (1995), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
atr/public/guidelines/0558.pdf [hereinafter ANTITRUST GUIDELINES] (stating that the rule
of reason applies in the “vast majority of cases”); see also Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1979).
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sessment method, this doctrine inquires into the anticompetitive
impact of a certain practice involving the licensing or use of intellectual property by raising particular questions about it.129 The
first question posed is “whether the restraint is likely to adversely affect competition. Second, if there is a likely anticompetitive effect, the inquiry determines whether the restraint on
competition is reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive . . . efficiencies . . . that outweigh those anticompetitive effects.”130 The analysis involves several steps, the first of
which is to define the “relevant market.”131 The definition of a
relevant market includes the product market and the geographic
market. The product market is defined by identifying substitutes
for the product, while the geographic market is defined by asking
whether consumers would import substitutes or similar products
if the price of a domestically produced product goes up.132
Once the relevant market is defined, the FTC or the DOJ
will assess market power. Market power is defined by these
agencies as “the ability profitably to maintain prices above, or
output below, competitive levels [in a relevant market] for a significant period of time.”133 An important factor in the ability to
exercise market power is the ease with which competitors can enter the relevant market.134 If market power exists, the agencies
will determine how that power was acquired, or how it will be
maintained. Transactions involving an agreement that might
hinder competition will be closely scrutinized.135 Moreover, market power may be acquired legally, but sustained illegally.136 Finally, even if market power is legally acquired and maintained,
certain anticompetitive business activity may violate antitrust
law if it unreasonably restrains competition.137
Evaluating copyrights arbitrarily under the “rule of reason”
illustrates why this area of intellectual property poses antitrust
problems that may be circumvented when analyzing patents under this doctrine. First, the relevant market for a book or song
proves that there are few substitutes for a consumer’s favorite
music or novel. A Bruce Springsteen fan is not likely to find solace listening to soft jazz instead, and neither is that consumer
ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 128, § 3.4.
Anthony, supra note 104, at 9.
Id. A relevant market is one in which products would actually and directly compete with one another. Id. at 10.
132 Id. at 9–10.
133 ANTITRUST GUIDELINES, supra note 128, § 2.2
134 Id. § 4.1.1.
135 See id. § 3.4.
136 Id. § 2.2.
137 Id.
129
130
131
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likely to import a CD from France to quench his desire to rock
out to “Born in the USA” if the price increases domestically. Music, like a good novel, is a particular good which consumers
choose because they identify the artist or author. By contrast,
many patented products, such as a car, can and will be substituted easily if domestic prices rise above certain utility levels.
Furthermore, the vast number of foreign cars on the streets is a
testament to the importability of such patented products. Still,
certain patented products, when used with and complimented by
copyrighted products, have become impossible to substitute, such
as iTunes and the iPod.
Market power can be quite accurately measured by the ability of a competitor to enter the market. Viewing copyrights
through a fundamental lens, not anyone can create a marketable
copyright to compete with those that are profitable. Authors
publish once and never publish again. Musicians come and go
without notice. Surprisingly, and quite unnoticed by most of the
music-consuming public, over 180 legitimate music download
services were launched globally in 2004.138 Why so unnoticed?
One commentator easily answers, emphasizing that “[y]our first
step in choosing a store should be determining which stores are
compatible with your portable music player, since online music
stores will not give refunds if you find you’ve made a mistake
later on.”139 Undoubtedly, such constraints keep Apple in control
of the market, selling over 600 million downloads between 2003
and the end of 2005, which accounted for 80% of legal music
downloads in the United States.140 Here, Apple’s tying arrangement, coupled with its first mover advantage, comes to fruition.
A first mover is a firm that is first to enter a market, creating opportunities to raise barriers to entry.141 The advantage can
translate into the ability to keep competitors out of the marketplace. Before competitors attempt to enter the market, the first
mover has the opportunity to collect substantial economic rents
through monopoly pricing.142 The first mover advantage can create economies of scale, which also deter competition because new
entries would have to incur losses once they enter the market bePress Release, IFPI, supra note 119.
Troy Dreier, Understanding Online Music Stores, CNET’S QUICK GUIDE, May 9,
2006, http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-11297_7-6518467-1.html.
140 Adam L. Penenberg, The Right Price for Digital Music, SLATE, Dec. 5, 2005,
http://www.slate.com/id/2131573/.
141 Posting of Narasimha Chari to VenChar, First Mover Advantage and Barriers to
Entry, http://www.venchar.com/2004/01/first_mover_adv.html (Jan. 8, 2004).
142 iTunes sells downloads for a flat rate of 99 cents. However, due to industry and
consumer criticism, the pricing structure may be changing to reflect the popularity of different types of music. See Jeff Leeds, Apple, Digital Music’s Angel, Earns Record Industry’s Scorn, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2005, at A1.
138
139
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fore they can attain the same efficiencies of scale.143 If the first
mover exploits a patent, especially if it is non-compatible with
other complimentary goods sold in the market, the ability to capture the consumer group and deter competition is great.144 In
this way, market power can be easily attained, as it has been by
Apple, by combining the licensing of copyrights with a patented
non-compatible technology.
As copyright’s campaign for property rights continues, the
economic inefficiencies that perpetual and overreaching protection creates will become manifest. The legal monopoly that is
conferred by the government should not exempt rights holders
from antitrust violations. Nevertheless, monopoly market power
can be alleviated by other instruments of law. One proposition
that has never been completely adopted is the government’s use
of its eminent domain power.
As Private Property advocates push for rights similar to
those recognized in tangible property, certain consequences to
copyright ownership may gain potential, including the concern of
copyrights becoming subject to the government’s eminent domain
power. This prospect, exposed in the next section, is made possible by copyright’s steadfast campaign and the antitrust problems
caused by this position. Adherence to the words of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8, as explained in Parts I and II, might diminish
the viability of this phenomenon. Nevertheless, because of the
current state of copyright law and the position that its proponents take, eminent domain has become a practicable possibility
for the government to alleviate the inefficiencies in copyright
law, which, ironically, were created by the government in the
first place. This occurrence would be unfortunate for copyright
owners. Therefore, the reality of this possibility, and the following proposal, should be recognized as both a warning to copyright
owners and an appeal for change in the way that copyright law is
made and interpreted.145
Posting of Narasimha Chari, supra note 141.
Id. (“[M]any elements of the first mover advantage can be leveraged into creating
strong barriers to entry[, including patents].”).
145 Complete abolishment of all copyright protection is not necessary. There is, after
all, some merit in rewarding creation by reserving a right to capitalize on that creation,
whether that capitalization be economic or otherwise. However, the correct interpretation
of the protection under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution calls for legislative reformation to account for a growing need for a public domain and the further accessibility of new information and ideas. A starting point for changing the currently prevailing interpretation is at the length of the term for copyright protection. Next, particularly
stifling legislation such as the DMCA should be reconsidered to minimize the see-saw relationship between technology and copyrighted content and to create a more balanced
equilibrium for the two so that technological advancement and new creative content can
progress as one.
143
144
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IV. AN EMINENT CONSEQUENCE: WHY COPYRIGHTS COULD
BECOME SUBJECT TO EMINENT DOMAIN
The Fifth Amendment states, in the negative, “nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”146 This Clause elicits the inference that the government
has the power to take certain private property, but the power is
limited by the requirements that the taking be only for a public
use, and that the government pay the owner just compensation
for harm done.147 Ambiguity in the Constitution is not an anomaly, and the clause conferring eminent domain power to the government is no exception. The assessments to be made when analyzing a taking under the Fifth Amendment include (1) whether
the thing to be taken actually constitutes private property, (2)
whether that private property is being taken for a public use, and
(3) what comprises just compensation.148 If all three are satisfied
according to the meaning conferred under the Constitution, then
such private property may be legally taken without successful objection by the owner of the property.149
A. Intellectual Property as Private Property
The U.S. Supreme Court recognizes that the eminent domain
power conferred under the Fifth Amendment applies to the states
via the Fourteenth Amendment.150 When read literally, private
property must be taken to invoke the Takings Clause. Land, because of its limited nature, is coveted by the government for particular uses which are easily attributable to the public interest.
Hence, the Clause chiefly applies in cases involving the disposition of real property.151 In such cases, the Court has deferred to
legislative judgment when analyzing public need for the use of
the takings power.152 If another form of private property exhibits
such a public need, it is reasonable to believe that the Court
would show similar deference when analyzing such a case under

U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Donald J. Kochan, “Public Use” and the Independent Judiciary: Condemnation in
an Interest-Group Perspective, 3 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 49, 60 (1998) (“The government is
given the power to take property for public uses when it is necessary to control the governed, but it is obliged to control itself by compensating property owners harmed by its
actions and by taking property only for public use.”).
148 See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231–32 (2003).
149 Id. at 232.
150 See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897).
151 See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005); Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
152 Berman, 348 U.S. at 33 (“If those who govern the District of Columbia decide that
the Nation’s Capital should be beautiful as well as sanitary, there is nothing in the Fifth
Amendment that stands in the way.”).
146
147
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the Eminent Domain Clause.153
The Court has expressed that the takings power may be applied to private property other than real property. In Phillips v.
Washington Legal Foundation,154 the Court was confronted with
a case involving the state’s use of interest on lawyers’ trust accounts (“IOLTA”) to pay for legal services provided to the needy.
The Court held “that the interest income generated by funds held
in IOLTA accounts is the ‘private property’ of the owner of the
principal.”155 In Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington,156 the
Court reaffirmed that the interest earned was private property.
The Court likened the transfer of the interest to a per se taking,
stating that the transfer of interest “seems more akin to the occupation of a small amount of rooftop space in Loretto.”157 In Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,158 the occupation
of rooftop space constituted a per se taking of private property
under the Fifth Amendment. Accordingly, in Brown, the Court
found the transfer of interest applicable under the Takings
Clause.159
Two sources could potentially provide states with the authority to take a privately owned patent from one company and have
another company manufacture the same patented product.160
First, a government’s eminent domain power, already executed
for the redevelopment of land and buildings, may be extended to
intellectual property such as prescription drug patents.161 In a
presentation to the National Legislative Association on Prescription Drug Prices, Law Professor Kevin Outterson proposed that
“[s]tates may exercise this power against pharmaceutical patents, just as they have always exercised eminent domain over
real property.”162 Second, in 1999, the U.S. Supreme Court held
in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v.
153 But see LEONARD C. GILROY, REASON FOUNDATION, STATEWIDE REGULATORY
TAKINGS REFORM: EXPORTING OREGON’S MEASURE 37 TO OTHER STATES (2006), available
at http://www.reason.org/ps343.pdf (examining eminent domain and the need for a movement toward stronger property rights and a limit on eminent domain’s application).
154 524 U.S. 156 (1998).
155 Id. at 172.
156 538 U.S. 216 (2003).
157 Id. at 235.
158 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982) (holding that the occupation of rooftop space constituted
a per se taking of private property under the Fifth Amendment).
159 Brown, 538 U.S. at 235.
160 Barbara T. Dreyfuss, Patents Pending: A D.C. Official Takes a Renegade Approach
to Get Lower-Priced Drugs for Residents, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT ONLINE EDITION, Feb.
23, 2005, www.prospect.org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewWeb&articleId=9237.
161 Id.; Volokh, supra note 1, at 1167.
162 Kevin Outterson, States May Reduce Drug Prices with an Eminent Domain Process for Pharmaceutical Patents, Presentation to the National Legislative Association on
Prescription Drug Prices, www.nlarx.org/present/modelpharmEDpresent.html (last visited April. 1, 2006).
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College Savings Bank163 that states are generally immune from
patent infringement if due process, by way of just compensation,
is afforded to the patent owner. The Court in Florida Prepaid
stressed that a state’s infringement of a patent is not by itself
unconstitutional, as long as some remedy is provided. In fact,
“only where the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate
remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement of their
patent could a deprivation of property without due process result.”164 Thus, per this decision, a state may take a privately held
patent, as long as it pays just compensation to the patent owner.
This holding seems odd considering the lengths to which the Supreme Court has gone to uphold absolute protection of intellectual property. Nevertheless, interpreted broadly, this holding
highlights the fact that protection for intellectual property is not
an absolute right, and government intervention may supersede
the exclusivity of this right.
The decision in Florida Prepaid, together with the decisions
in the IOLTA cases, fuel the prospect that intellectual property
could viably become subject to a state’s eminent domain power.
This idea was considered seriously by legislators in the District of
Columbia, when David A. Catania, Councilmember of the Committee on Health, introduced the Prescription Drug Compulsory
Manufacture License Act of 2005.165 The bill proposed that, under eminent domain authority, a state should be able to require a
compulsory license to produce a patented pharmaceutical product. Further, the state should be able to pass that license on to a
generic firm to produce the product in an effort to alleviate
pharmaceutical prices.166 At a public hearing concerning the bill,
Professor Kevin Outterson stated the following:
[I]ntellectual property proponents are making a push to call patents,
copyrights and trademarks “intellectual property” so they are covered
by eminent domain protections. The Supreme Court has gone along
with this argument. States have the right, for a public purpose, to
take private property as long as they pay just compensation. If we can
do it with a house, why should the state not be able to, not take the
patent right, but force pharmaceutical manufacturers to give us a nonexclusive license? Given that this policy would positively impact
527 U.S. 627, 643 (1999).
Id.
Bill 16-114, Comm. on Health, Council of the District of Columbia, 16th Council
Period (D.C. 2005) (codifed as amended as the Prescription Drug Excessive Pricing Act of
2005, D.C. CODE § 28-4551 (2006)), available at http://www.dccouncil.washington.dc.us/
images/00001/20050211092234.pdf.
166 Committee on Health, Council of the District of Columbia, Draft Committee Report on Bill 16-114, the “Prescription Drug Compulsory Manufacture License Act of 2005”,
at 3–4 (Mar. 23, 2005), available at http://www.nlarx.com/modelleg/docs/
DCRprtCompulsoryLicensing16-114.doc.
163
164
165
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Medicaid recipients and employees of the state, eminent domain
should be available to serve this public purpose.167

Though the bill’s sponsor, Catania, backed off from the eminent
domain idea, the precedent was set for the novel theory. Eminent domain’s application to intellectual property may be close in
time.
Substituting copyrights for patents in such a bill, and under
the “private property” assessment in an eminent domain analysis, is, unfortunately, easily envisioned. As mentioned previously, copyright owners have campaigned for years that copyrights are in fact “private property,” as that word is meant under
the Fifth Amendment. The writers of Catania’s bill agreed, stating that “intellectual property proponents are making a push to
call patents, copyrights and trademarks ‘intellectual property’ so
they are covered by eminent domain . . . .”168 Although there are
shortfalls in the parallel between intellectual property and “private property,” the current prevailing campaign by Congress and
in the Court is to equate the two.169 Thus, it is not the inherent
nature of copyrights that calls for application of the eminent domain process. Instead, it is the incorrect insistence that copyright proponents themselves have made for over two hundred
years that invites the application of copyrights to this process. In
sum, copyrights satisfy the first step in the eminent domain
analysis not by their own attributes, but because they have been
mistakenly forced into this assessment by their own sponsors.
B. A Public Use for Copyrights
The Supreme Court, within the last century, has claimed
that the public use provision within the Takings Clause does not
particularly mean what it literally says.170 In practice, there is
now no requisite public use of the property taken.171 Rather, the
Court has explicitly rejected any “use by the public” test for public use.172 Specifically, the Court has stated that “[i]t is not essential that the entire community, nor even any considerable
portion . . . directly enjoy or participate in any improvement in

Id. at 4.
Id. (emphasis added).
The continued extension of the copyright term toward perpetual protection, and
the decisions by the Court to uphold these extensions, shows that Congress and the Court
have slowly but surely agreed that intellectual property owners should be afforded the
same rights as private tangible property owners. See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
204 (2003).
170 Kochan, supra note 147, at 51–52.
171 Id.
172 Rindge Co. v. Los Angeles County, 262 U.S. 700, 707 (1923).
167
168
169
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order [for it] to constitute a public use.”173 Moreover, the Court
has expressly provided that the legislature’s determination will
receive deference as “well-nigh conclusive” of the public interest
in the taking.174 Provided with the Court’s deference, the legislature needs only a good reason, or purpose, to take private property in the public interest.
Most recently, in Kelo v. City of New London, the Court held
that “a State may transfer property from one private party to another if future ‘use by the public’ is the purpose of the taking . . . .”175 The Supreme Court has conveniently reduced “use
by the public” to a “carefully considered” economic plan176 that
serves a broadly defined public purpose.177 In fact, the Court has
approved of takings for “public use” in a purely economic context.
In Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the Court approved a
statute allowing the state to take land from lessors and transfer
it to lessees in order to reduce the concentration of land ownership.178 The Court concluded that eliminating the “social and
economic evils of a land oligopoly” qualified as a valid public
use.179 In Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., the Court concluded that
eliminating a significant barrier to entry in the pesticide market
and thereby enhancing competition constituted a public use.180
This line of decisions under the Takings Clause increases the
likelihood that intellectual property, under copyright proponents’
stretched definition, may be taken for public use.
Legislatures may soon claim that the economic inefficiencies
resulting from its own government-granted monopolies in copyrights and patents may just prove reason enough for federal and
state governing bodies to follow the lead of David Catania and
the District of Columbia. The public purpose in that specific instance, to alleviate pharmaceutical prices to the consuming public,181 would surely pass the Supreme Court’s current public use
doctrine. As discussed, in the copyright arena, a similar situation may have already surfaced with iTunes and the iPod.182
That problem may worsen as the music industry collapses into
one media conglomerate,183 and the right to sell music is decided
Id.
Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954).
125 S. Ct. 2655, 2661 (2005).
Id. at 2661.
Id. at 2663.
467 U.S. 229, 231–32 (1984).
Id. at 241–42.
467 U.S. 986, 1015–16 (1984).
Outterson, supra note 162.
Hsu, supra note 99, at 122.
See Press Release, IFPI, supra note 119 (noting that currently, 71.7% of the recording industry’s global market share is allocated to just four companies).
173
174
175
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
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by one company, or even one person. Surely, if breaking up a
land oligopoly serves a public purpose, constituting a valid taking
of land,184 so could breaking up a media oligopoly, constituting a
“valid” taking of copyrights.
Under this hypothesized exercise, a state might implement
legislation calling for compulsory licensing of copyrights for just
compensation. In this way, the government will force the transfer of certain rights to the use and sale of a copyrighted product
from one private party to another, or many others. The price,
just compensation, will be paid by the government. In effect, the
result of the process is similar to a right of first sale.185 The
transferees will be similarly situated entities with the capabilities of marketing and selling such products to the public. The result will be increased competition, increased output, and decreased prices to the public, which legislatures will call a
beneficial public purpose. This directly mimics the purely economic benefit in Midkiff—the Supreme Court has already given
its blessing to this supposed public use, taking from A and giving
to the rest of the alphabet. Again, in Kelo, the Court approved
such a maneuver.186
In the context of eminent domain as applied to copyright, the
benefit could be deemed public because of the facilitation of public access to information. Moreover, if the same practice is duplicated for patented technology such as Apple’s AAC codec technology,187 market frustration and fragmentation will be alleviated by
technological homogeneity. As a result, the consuming public
will not have to ask whether the music they are buying will work
with their respective player, and the 180 legal music downloading services launched in 2004188 will sell more downloads. Presumably, the holding in Florida Prepaid will extend to copyrights, leaving the state immune from an infringement suit as
long as due process is granted by paying just compensation for
the taking.
The ease with which the proposed system fits within the legal framework for “public use,” and the compelling justifications
that seemingly create valid benefits for imposing the process,
Haw. Hous. Auth., 467 U.S. at 231.
Douglas Clement, Creation Myths: Does Innovation Require Intellectual Property
Rights?,
REASON,
Mar.
2003,
at
35,
available
at
http://www.reason.com/news/show/28703.html
(“Boldrin
and
Levine
emphasize
that . . . . innovators should be given ‘a well defined right of first sale.’ . . . [a]nd creators
should be paid the full market value of their invention, the first unit of the new product.
That value is . . . the current value of everything it’s going to earn in the future.”).
186 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661.
187 Apple, supra note 122.
188 Press Release, IFPI, supra note 119.
184
185
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should be heeded by copyright proponents. Open eyes do not
have to strain to foresee the possibility and its apparent suitability under current Supreme Court interpretation. This should be
enough to curtail current practice and interpretation.
C. Just Compensation for Copyrights
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he Fifth
Amendment does not proscribe the taking of property; it proscribes taking without just compensation.”189 Just compensation
is measured by the property owner’s loss, not the government’s
gain.190 The owner must be returned to a position as if the property had not been taken; he is entitled to no more.191 If the net
loss is zero, however, then just compensation due will be zero.192
On its surface, this raises a concern for those who might invest in
property; but even in the open market, those investors would receive nothing in return for this investment because there is no
expectation of a return.
In the case of a copyright owner, just compensation will be
the loss of the right to sell the copyrighted product. A copyright
is not limited, and therefore the sale, or lease, of a copyright is
not a one-time transaction. Profits from the sale of a copyrighted
product are earned over time by collecting royalties. Therefore,
the current net loss to the copyright owner will be the future
right to collect royalties. In such a case, just compensation would
be difficult to measure, if not impossible. Nonetheless, by using a
system which calculates actual sales and downloads of the copyright, just compensation could be measured and paid over time,
just as royalties are collected. However, it is possible that the
legislation would not include future profits in “just” compensation.193 In this case, a reasonable royalty, including interest and
costs, would be calculated and paid.194 This raises an important
concern for copyright owners because most revenue generated by
copyrights is earned over a long period of time. Legislation, by
neglecting to include future profits in just compensation, would
be getting off easy without accounting for an adequate return on
investment. Again, this possibility should encourage copyright
189

(1985).

Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 194

Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 237 (2003).
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934).
Brown, 538 U.S. at 237–38.
Committee on Health, supra note 166, at 11 (stating that Councilmember Catania
responded that “the current body of law supports the idea that such a payment would not
include compensation for lost profits”).
194 Id. (“[U]nder equitable principles of fairness, a reasonable, not excessive royalty
would be appropriate.”).
190
191
192
193
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owners to change the course of their current campaign to ensure
that this does not become a reality.
D. Research and Development
In the patent arena, the adverse effect on research and development is the most recognized and wholly legitimate argument against the use of eminent domain.195 Opponents argue
that compulsory licensure of patents will undermine the incentives for research and development.196 In light of the huge costs
associated with research and development,197 companies investing in patents will be hesitant to spend such time and money on
their creations if their creations can be taken away.
This argument is not as successful in the copyright arena,
making copyrights more apt to be subject to eminent domain. Although research and development plays an integral part in the
development process of a patent, demanding substantial investments of time and money,198 these investments of time and
money are not usually as substantial in the development of a
copyright. A songwriter does not employ a research and development team as does a pharmaceutical company.199 During the
mid-1990s, one patent was granted in the software industry for
every $10 million spent on research and development.200 It is difficult to imagine that the same level of investment is usually expended to create a song, book, or painting.201 Thus, the fear of
expending resources for little return must be far less with copyrights than with patents. Following this intuition, Nobel Prize
winner and renowned economist Robert Lucas offers the following comparison of copyrights with patents:
If we do not enforce copyrights to music, will people stop writing and
recording songs? . . . . Not likely . . . . If so, then protection against
musical ‘piracy’ just comes down to protecting monopoly positions:
something economists usually oppose, and with reason.
. . . . [But w]hat about pharmaceuticals? . . . Here millions are spent
Outterson, supra note 162.
Id.
Committee on Health, supra note 166, at 11 (summarizing Sharon Treat’s testimony that “drug companies often cite research and development as huge costs”).
198 Id.
199 Clement, supra note 185, at 38 (“Much of the high cost of pharmaceutical
R&D . . . is due to the inflated values placed on drug researchers’ time because they are
employed by monopolists.”).
200 James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, The Software Patent Experiment, 2004 FED.
RES. BANK OF PHILA. BUS. REV. 27 (2004), available at http://www.phil.frb.org/
files/br/brq304rh.pdf.
201 The music industry will argue that recording costs are relatively high, but these
costs are steadily in decline because new technology makes music recording inexpensive.
See supra note 37.
195
196
197
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on developing new drugs. Why do this if the good ideas can be quickly
copied?202

In this light, unfortunately, it is easy to envision the government’s prospective argument that compulsory licensing of
copyrights would not destroy the copyright creation process in
the same way that compulsory licensing of patents might destroy
the incentive to invest in patent creation. Because the incentive
does not disappear, and because lower costs are more easily covered by payment of just compensation, the primary argument
that prevents subjecting patents to the eminent domain process
does not translate to the copyright arena. Copyright campaigners should take note of this and amend their practices accordingly.
CONCLUSION
This Comment demonstrates to copyright proponents that
their very insistence on lobbying for absolute and perpetual protection actually opens the door to unwanted consequences. First,
there are fundamental problems associated with characterizing
intellectual property as tangible private property. Although fine
arguments have been made by proponents of the private property
theory, most of these proponents are self-interested owners of intellectual property rights. These owners understandably have a
vested interest in securing profits for themselves in a system that
promotes rent-seeking activities. Nevertheless, affording to intellectual property the same perpetual and absolute property
rights that are granted to tangible private property causes economic inefficiencies as well as internal friction in the creative
process.
Second, the historical, and currently prevailing, campaign
for property rights conducted by copyright advocates has never
been denied, despite the inefficiencies created by recognizing
perpetual intellectual monopolies. Courts and legislators have
heeded to lobbying pressures, continually strengthening and extending copyright protection, approaching the perpetual protection afforded to tangible property. Although protecting the interests of authors is not without merit, absolute copyright protection
is not the most efficient method to spur creativity. In fact, this
method actually thwarts the creative process by failing to recognize the importance of free and unobstructed dissemination of information to the creative process. Furthermore, the true intent
of the Constitution, which states that such protection shall only
202 Clement, supra note 185, at 37 (quoting Robert E. Lucas, Jr., Nobel Laureate and
Economist, Univ. of Chi.).
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be “for limited Times,”203 is not being correctly followed.
Third, copyright’s historical outline, proof that Congress and
the Courts tend to treat copyrights like absolute property rights,
has antitrust implications. The practical application shows that
market inefficiencies are created through the monopoly power
conferred by intellectual property laws to copyright and patent
owners. Such inefficiencies cause less output, and higher prices
to consumers, of patented and copyrighted products. Furthermore, the sale of copyrighted products tied with the sale of an incompatible patented technology, such as iTunes and the iPod,
produces a fragmented and frustrated market for the copyrighted
products. When a monopoly over this business model is legally
obtained, antitrust law intentions are debased, and antitrust law
is violated.
This phenomenon is consistent with, and provides further
support for, the proposition that legislators may create for themselves an escape from the quagmire they have established, and
find it both worthy and constitutional to subject intellectual
property, and more specifically copyrights, to the power of eminent domain. It is not the author’s intention to argue for the
immediate application of eminent domain with blind ambition.
Instead, the intention has been to suggest a viable, although unattractive, alternative to the inefficiencies created by intellectual
monopolies in an effort to instill motivation to change current
legislation and copyright law interpretations. The proposed system would involve a compulsory licensing scheme that mirrors a
right of first sale for copyright owners. The transaction would
include the required transfer of a copyrighted product, in return
for just compensation to be paid over time as royalties are paid.
Utilizing the Takings Clause204 in the Constitution as a sword,
and exploiting the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank205 as a shield, legislators have created for themselves both
the authority and purpose to take copyrighted materials and
transfer them to other entities, private or not, for a public use.
The rationale to do so depends on the extremity of antitrust implications that will arise from perpetual ownership of intellectual
monopolies. In the media industry, which includes music, film,
and publishing, this possibility becomes more evident as market
diversity moves toward singular control by one media conglomerate.

203
204
205

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999).
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Although this use of the Takings Clause will undoubtedly solicit great opposition, it seems hypocritical for copyright proponents to argue for equating copyrights with private property for
the last two hundred years, and then to argue that those very
same copyrights should not become subject to the Takings
Clause. Copyright proponents can only avoid such a hypocritical
position by receiving this warning and modifying their stance on
property rights. In sum, for the benefit of copyright owners,
copyright’s campaign for property rights should blow the whistle
on itself. If this Comment’s proposed action should indeed present itself in legislation, the words “for limited Times” will be the
“I told you so” from the Founding Fathers.
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